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Abstract
Many semantical aspects of programming languages,
such as their operational semantics and their type assign-
ment calculi, are specified by describing appropriate proof
systems. Recent research has identified two proof-theoretic
features that allow direct, logic-based reasoning about such
descriptions: the treatment of atomic judgments as fixed
points (recursive definitions) and an encoding of binding
constructs via generic judgments. However, the logics en-
compassing these two features have thus far treated them
orthogonally: that is, they do not provide the ability to de-
fine object-logic properties that themselves depend on an
intrinsic treatment of binding. We propose a new and sim-
ple integration of these features within an intuitionistic logic
enhanced with induction over natural numbers and we show
that the resulting logic is consistent. The pivotal benefit
of the integration is that it allows recursive definitions to
not just encode simple, traditional forms of atomic judg-
ments but also to capture generic properties pertaining to
such judgments. The usefulness of this logic is illustrated
by showing how it can provide elegant treatments of object-
logic contexts that appear in proofs involving typing calculi
and of arbitrarily cascading substitutions that play a role in
reducibility arguments.
Keywords: generic judgments, higher-order abstract syn-
tax, proof search, reasoning about operational semantics
1. Introduction
An important approach to specifying and reasoning
about computations involves proof theory and proof search.
We discuss below three kinds of judgments about computa-
tional systems that one might want to capture and the proof
theoretic techniques that have been used to capture them.
We divide this discussion into two parts: the first part deals
with judgments over algebraic terms and the second with
judgments over terms-with-binders. We then exploit this
overview to describe the new features of the logic we are
presenting in this paper.
1.1. Judgments involving algebraic terms
We overview features of proof theory that support recur-
sive definitions about first-order (algebraic) terms and, us-
ing CCS as an example, we illustrate the judgments about
computations that can be encoded through such definitions.
(1) Logic programming, may behavior Logic program-
ming languages allow for a natural specification and ani-
mation of operational semantics and typing judgments: this
observation goes back to at least the Centaur project and
its animation of Typol specifications using Prolog [5]. For
example, Horn clauses provide a simple and immediate en-
coding of CCS labeled transition systems and unification
and backtracking provide a means for exploring what is
reachable from a given process. Traditional logic program-
ming is, however, limited to may behavior judgments: us-
ing it, we cannot prove that a given CCS process P cannot
make a transition and, since this negative property is logi-
cally equivalent to proving that P is bisimilar to 0 (the null
process), such systems cannot capture bisimulation.
(2) Model checking, must behavior Proof theoretic
techniques for must behaviors (such as bisimulation and
many model checking problems) have been developed in
the early 1990’s [8, 29] and further extended later [15].
Since these techniques work by unfolding computations un-
til termination, they are applicable to recursive definitions
that are noetherian. As an example, bisimulation for finite
CCS can be given an immediate and declarative specifica-
tion [17].
(3) Theorem proving, infinite behavior Reasoning
about all members of a domain or about possibly infinite
executions requires induction and coinduction. Incorporat-
ing induction in proof theory goes back to Gentzen. The
work in [15, 23, 33] provides induction and coinduction
rules associated with the above-mentioned recursive defi-
nitions. In such a setting, one can prove, for example, that
(strong) bisimulation in CCS is a congruence.
1.2. Judgments involving bindings
The proof theoretic treatment of binding in terms has
echoed the three stages of development described above.
We switch from CCS to the π-calculus to illustrate the dif-
ferent kinds of judgments that these support.
(1) Logic programming, λ-tree syntax Higher-order
generalizations of logic programming, such as higher-order
hereditary Harrop formulas [21] and the dependently typed
LF [9], adequately capture may behavior for terms contain-
ing bindings. In particular, the presence of hypothetical
and universal judgments supports the λ-tree syntax [20] ap-
proach to higher-order abstract syntax [26]. The logic pro-
gramming languages λProlog [24] and Twelf [27] support
such syntax representations and provide simple specifica-
tion of, for example, reachability in the π-calculus.
(2) Model checking, ∇-quantification While the no-
tions of universal quantification and generic judgment are
often conflated, a satisfactory treatment of must behavior re-
quires splitting apart these concepts. The ∇-quantifier [22]
was introduced to encode generic judgments directly. To il-
lustrate the issues here, consider the formula ∀w.¬(λx.x =
λx.w). If we think of λ-terms as denoting abstracted syntax
(terms modulo α-conversion), this formula should be prov-
able (variable capture is not allowed in logically sound sub-
stitution). If we think of λ-terms as describing functions,
then the equation λy.t = λy.s is equivalent to ∀y.t = s.
But then our example formula is equivalent to ∀w.¬∀x.x =
w, which should not be provable since it is not true in a
model with a single element domain. To think of λ-terms
syntactically instead, we treat λy.t = λy.s as equivalent
to ∇y.t = s. In this case, our example formula is equiva-
lent to ∀w.¬∇x.x = w, which is provable [22]. Using this
quantifier, the π-calculus process (νx).[x = w].w¯x can be
encoded such that it is provably bisimilar to 0. Bedwyr [3]
is a model checker that treats such generic judgments.
(3) Theorem proving, LGω When there is only finite
behavior, logics for recursive definitions do not need the
cut or initial rules, and, consequently, they do not need
to answer the question “When are two generic judgments
equal?” On the other hand, induction and coinduction do
need an answer to this question: e.g., when doing induction
over natural numbers, one must be able to recognize that the
case for i + 1 has been reduced to the case for i. The LGω
proof system [34] provides a natural setting for answering
this question. Using LGω encodings, one can prove that
(open) bisimulation is a π-calculus congruence.
1.3. Allowing definitions of generic judgments
In the developments discussed above, recursive defini-
tions are permitted only for atomic judgments. In many
syntax analysis problems, binding constructs are treated by
building up a local context that attributes properties to the
objects they bind. In reasoning about such analyses, it is of-
ten necessary to be able to associate relevant generic proper-
ties with atomic judgments. For example, a typical type as-
signment calculus for λ-terms treats abstractions by adding
assumptions about the type of the bound variables to the
context of the typing judgment. To model such a context,
we might use a predicate cntx that encodes the assignment
of types to abstracted variables. Thus, an atomic judgment
of the form cntx [〈x1, t1〉, . . . , 〈xn, tn〉] would denote the
assignment of types t1, . . . , tn to the variables x1, . . . , xn
and can be used as a hypothesis in the course of determin-
ing the type of a term. Now, certain “generic” properties
hold implicitly of the contexts that are constructed: for ex-
ample, these assign types only to bound variables and have
at most one assignment for each of them. Such properties
are not actually used in encoding the rules for type infer-
ence but they do have to be made explicit if we want to
prove properties, such as the determinacy of type assign-
ment, about the calculus that is encoded. Recursive defi-
nitions provide a means for formalizing properties that are
needed in these kinds of reasoning tasks. Unfortunately,
these definitions are not strong enough in their present form
to allow for the convenient statement of generic properties
ranging over atomic judgments.
These issues surrounding the specification of contexts
are actually endemic to reasoning about many different
kinds of specifications that utilize λ-tree syntax. We pro-
vide an elegant treatment of it here by extending recursive
definitions to apply not only to atomic but also to generic
judgments. Using this device, we will, for instance, be able
to define a property of the form
∇x1 · · ·∇xn. cntx [〈x1, t1〉, . . . , 〈xn, tn〉].
By stating the property in this way, we ensure that cntx as-
signs types only to variables and at most one to each. Now,
this property can be used in an inductive proof, provided it
can be verified that the contexts that are built up during type
analysis recursively satisfy the definition. We present rules
that support this style of argument.
1.4. An outline of the paper
Section 2 describes the logic G that allows for the ex-
tended form of definitions and Section 3 establishes its con-
sistency. The extension has significant consequences for
writing and reasoning about logical specifications. We pro-
vide a hint of this through a few examples in Section 4; as
discussed later, many other applications such as solutions
to the POPLmark challenge problems [2], cut-elimination
for sequent calculi, and an encoding of Tait’s logical re-
lations based proof of normalization for the simply typed
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λ-calculus [32] have been successfully developed using the
Abella system that implements G. We conclude the paper
with a comparison to related work and an indication of fu-
ture directions.
2. A logic with generalized definitions
The logic G is obtained by extending an intuitionistic and
predicative subset of Church’s Simple Theory of Types with
fixed point definitions, natural number induction, and a new
quantifier for encoding generic judgments. Its main com-
ponents are elaborated in the subsections below. It is pos-
sible to develop a classical variant of G as well: we do not
follow that path but just comment that moving from intu-
itionistic to classical logic can have interesting impacts on
specifications. For example, the intuitionistic reading of the
specification of bisimulation for the π-calculus yields open
bisimulation while the classical reading of the same speci-
fication yields late bisimulation [36].
2.1. The basic syntax
Following Church [6], terms are constructed using ab-
straction and application from constants and (bound) vari-
ables. All terms are typed using a monomorphic typing
system; these types also constrain the set of well-formed
expressions in the expected way. The provability relation
concerns well-formed terms of the distinguished type o that
are also called formulas. Logic is introduced by including
special constants representing the propositional connectives
⊤, ⊥, ∧, ∨, ⊃ and, for every type τ that does not contain o,
the constants ∀τ and ∃τ of type (τ → o) → o. The binary
propositional connectives are written as usual in infix form
and the expressions ∀τx.B and ∃τx.B abbreviate the for-
mulas ∀τλx.B and ∃τλx.B, respectively. Type subscripts
will be omitted from quantified formulas when they can be
inferred from the context or are not important to the discus-
sion. We also use a shorthand for iterated quantification: if
Q is a quantifier, the expressionQx1, . . . , xn.P will abbre-
viate Qx1 . . .Qxn.P .
The usual inference rules for the universal quantifier
can be seen as equating it to the conjunction of all of its
instances: that is, this quantifier is treated extensionally.
There are a number of situations [22] where one wishes to
have a generic treatment of a statement like “B(x) holds for
all x”: in these situations, the form of the argument is im-
portant and not the argument’s behavior on all its possible
instances. To encode such generic judgments, we use the
∇-quantifier (nabla) [22]. Syntactically, this quantifier cor-
responds to including a constant ∇τ of type (τ → o) → o
for each type τ (not containing o). As with the other quan-
tifiers, ∇τx.B abbreviates∇τλx.B and the type subscripts
are often suppressed for readability.
2.2. Generic judgments and ∇-quantification
Sequents in intuitionistic logic are usually written as
Σ : B1, . . . , Bn ⊢ B0 (n ≥ 0)
where Σ is the “global signature” for the sequent: in partic-
ular, it contains the eigenvariables of the sequent proof. We
shall think of Σ in this prefix position as being a binding
operator for each variable it contains. The FOλ∆∇ logic
[22] introduced “local signatures” for each formula in the
sequent: that is, sequents are written instead as
Σ : σ1 ⊲ B1, . . . , σn ⊲ Bn ⊢ σ0 ⊲ B0,
where each σ0, . . . , σn is a list of variables that are bound
locally in the formula adjacent to it. Such local signa-
tures within proofs reflect bindings in formulas using the
∇-quantifier: in particular, the judgment and formula
x1, . . . , xn ⊲ B and ∇x1 · · · ∇xn.B (n ≥ 0)
have the same proof-theoretic force.
The FOλ∆∇ logic [22] (and its partial implementation
in the Bedwyr logic programming/model checking system
[3]) eschewed atomic formulas for explicit fixed point (re-
cursive) definitions, along with inference rules to unfold
them. In such a system, both the cut-rule and the initial rule
can be eliminated and checking the equality of two generic
judgments is not necessary. As we have already mentioned,
when one is proving more ambitious theorems involving in-
duction and coinduction, equality of generic judgments be-
comes important.
2.3. LGω and structural rules for ∇-quantification
There are two equations for ∇ that we seem forced to
include when we consider proofs by induction. In a sense,
these equations play the role of structural rules for the lo-
cal, generic context. Written at the level of formulas, they
are the ∇-exchange rule ∇x∇y.F = ∇y∇x.F and the ∇-
strengthening rule ∇x.F = F , provided x is not free in F .
The LGω proof system of Tiu [34] is essentially FOλ∆∇
extended with these two structural rules for ∇.
The move from the weaker FOλ∆∇ to the strongerLGω
logic has at least two important additional consequences.
First, the strengthening rule implies that every type at
which one is willing to use∇-quantification is not only non-
empty but contains an unbounded number of members. For
example, the formulas ∃τx.⊤ is always provable, even if
there are no closed terms of type τ because this formula is
equivalent to ∇τy∃τx.⊤ which is provable, as will be clear
from the proof system given in Figure 1. Similarly, for any
given n ≥ 1, the following formula is provable
∃x1 . . .∃xn[
∧
1≤i,j≤n,i6=j
xi 6= xj ].
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π.B = π′.B′
Σ : Γ, B ⊢ B′
idpi
Σ : Γ ⊢ B Σ : B,∆ ⊢ C
Σ : Γ,∆ ⊢ C
cut
Σ : Γ, B,B ⊢ C
Σ : Γ, B ⊢ C
cL
Σ : Γ,⊥ ⊢ C
⊥L
Σ : Γ, B ⊢ C Σ : Γ, D ⊢ C
Σ : Γ, B ∨D ⊢ C
∨L
Σ : Γ ⊢ Bi
Σ : Γ ⊢ B1 ∨B2
∨R, i ∈ {1, 2}
Σ : Γ ⊢ ⊤
⊤R
Σ : Γ, Bi ⊢ C
Σ : Γ, B1 ∧B2 ⊢ C
∧L, i ∈ {1, 2} Σ : Γ ⊢ B Σ : Γ ⊢ C
Σ : Γ ⊢ B ∧ C
∧R
Σ : Γ ⊢ B Σ : Γ, D ⊢ C
Σ : Γ, B ⊃ D ⊢ C
⊃ L
Σ : Γ, B ⊢ C
Σ : Γ ⊢ B ⊃ C
⊃ R
Σ,K, C ⊢ t : τ Σ : Γ, B[t/x] ⊢ C
Σ : Γ, ∀τx.B ⊢ C
∀L
Σ, h : Γ ⊢ B[h ~c/x]
Σ : Γ ⊢ ∀x.B
∀R, h /∈ Σ, supp(B) = {~c}
Σ : Γ, B[a/x] ⊢ C
Σ : Γ,∇x.B ⊢ C
∇L, a /∈ supp(B)
Σ : Γ ⊢ B[a/x]
Σ : Γ ⊢ ∇x.B
∇R, a /∈ supp(B)
Σ, h : Γ, B[h ~c/x] ⊢ C
Σ : Γ, ∃x.B ⊢ C
∃L, h /∈ Σ, supp(B) = {~c}
Σ,K, C ⊢ t : τ Σ : Γ ⊢ B[t/x]
Σ : Γ ⊢ ∃τx.B
∃R
Figure 1. The core rules of G
Second, the validity of the strengthening and exchange
rules mean that all local contexts can be made equal. As a
result, the local binding can now be considered as an (im-
plicit) global binder. In such a setting, the collection of
globally ∇-bound variables can be replaced with nominal
constants. Of course, in light of the exchange rule, we must
consider atomic judgments as being identical if they differ
by only permutations of such constants.
We shall follow the LGω approach to treating ∇. Thus,
for every type we assume an infinite collection of nominal
constants. The collection of all nominal constants is de-
noted by C; these constants are to be distinguished from the
collection of usual, non-nominal constants that we denote
by K. We define the support of a term (or formula), writ-
ten supp(t), as the set of nominal constants appearing in it.
A permutation of nominal constants is a bijection π from
C to C such that {x | π(x) 6= x} is finite and π preserves
types. Permutations will be extended to terms (and formu-
las), written π.t, as follows:
π.a = π(a), if a ∈ C π.c = c, if c /∈ C is atomic
π.(λx.M) = λx.(π.M) π.(M N) = (π.M) (π.N)
The core fragment of G is presented in Figure 1. Se-
quents in this logic have the form Σ : Γ ⊢ C where Γ is a
multiset and the signature Σ contains all the free variables
of Γ and C. In the ∇L and ∇R rules, a denotes a nominal
constant of an appropriate type. In the ∃L and ∀R rule we
use raising [19] to encode the dependency of the quantified
variable on the support of B; the expression (h ~c) used in
these two rules denotes the (curried) application of h to the
constants appearing in the sequence~c. The ∀L and ∃R rules
make use of judgments of the form Σ,K, C ⊢ t : τ . These
judgments enforce the requirement that the expression t in-
stantiating the quantifier in the rule is a well-formed term
of type τ constructed from the variables in Σ and the con-
stants in K∪C. Notice that in contrast the ∀R and ∃L rules
seem to allow for a dependency on only a restricted set of
nominal constants. However, this asymmetry is not signifi-
cant: the dependency expressed through raising in the latter
rules can be extended to any number of nominal constants
that are not in the relevant support set without affecting the
provability of sequents.
2.4. Recursive definitions
The structure of definitions in G is, in a sense, its distin-
guishing characteristic. To motivate their form and also to
understand their expressiveness, we consider first the defi-
nitions that are permitted in LGω. In that setting, a defini-
tional clause has the form ∀~x.H , B where H is an atomic
formula all of whose free variables are contained in ~x and
B is an arbitrary formula all of whose free variables must
also be free in H . In a clause of this sort, H is called the
head and B is called the body and a (possibly infinite) col-
lection of clauses constitutes a definition. Now, there are
two properties of such definitional clauses that should be
noted. First, H and B are restricted to not contain occur-
rences of nominal constants. Second, the interpretation of
such a clause permits the variables in ~x to be instantiated
with terms containing any nominal constant; intuitively, the
quantificational structure at the head of the definition has
a ∇∀ form, with the (implicit) ∇ quantification being over
arbitrary sequences of nominal constants. These two prop-
erties actually limit the power of definitions: (subparts of)
terms satisfying the relations they identify cannot be forced
to be nominal constants and, similarly, specific (sub)terms
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cannot be stipulated to be independent of such constants.
These shortcomings are addressed in G by allowing defi-
nitional clauses to take the form ∀~x.(∇~z.H) , B where all
the free variables in ∇~z.H must appear in ~x and all the free
variables in B must also be free in ∇~z.H . The intended in-
terpretation of the ∇ quantification over H is that particular
terms appearing in the relation being defined must be identi-
fied as nominal constants although specific names may still
not be assigned to these constants. Moreover, the location
of this quantifier changes the prefix over the head from a
∇∀ form to the more general ∇∀∇ form. Concretely, the
explicit ∇ quantification over ~z forces the instantiations for
the externally ∀ quantified variables ~x to be independent of
the nominal constants used for ~z.
One illustration of the definitions permitted in G is pro-
vided by the following clause:
(∇n.name n) , ⊤.
An atomic predicate name N would satisfy this clause pro-
vided that it can be matched with its head. For this to be
possible, N must be a nominal constant. Thus, name is a
predicate that recognizes such constants. As another exam-
ple, consider the clause
∀E.(∇x.fresh x E) , ⊤.
In this case the atomic formula fresh N T will satisfy the
clause just in case N is a nominal constant and T is a term
that does not contain this constant (the impossibility of vari-
able capture ensures this constraint). Thus, this clause ex-
presses the property of a name being “fresh” to a given term.
Further illustrations of the new form of definitions and their
use in reasoning tasks are considered in Section 4.
Definitions impact the logical system through introduc-
tion rules for atomic judgments. Formalizing these rules
involves the use of substitutions. A substitution θ is a
type-preserving mapping (whose application is written in
postfix notation) from variables to terms, such that the set
{x | xθ 6= x} is finite. Although a substitution is extended
to a mapping from terms to terms, formulas to formulas, etc,
when we refer to its domain and range, we mean these sets
for this most basic function. A substitution is extended to a
function from terms to terms in the usual fashion. If Γ is a
multiset of formulas thenΓθ is the multiset {Jθ | J ∈ Γ}. If
Σ is a signature then Σθ is the signature that results from re-
moving from Σ the variables in the domain of θ and adding
the variables that are free in the range of θ.
To support the desired interpretation of a definitional
clause, when matching the head of ∀~x.(∇~z.H) , B with an
atomic judgment, we must permit the instantiations for ~x to
contain the nominal constants appearing in that judgment.
Likewise, we must consider instantiations for the eigenvari-
ables appearing in the judgment that possibly contain the
nominal constants chosen for ~z. Both possibilities can be
{Σ′θ : (π.B′)θ,Γ′θ ⊢ C′θ}
Σ : A,Γ ⊢ C
defL
Σ′ : Γ′ ⊢ (π.B′)θ
Σ : Γ ⊢ A
defR
Figure 2. Rules for definitions
realized via raising. Given a clause ∀x1, . . . , xn.(∇~z.H) ,
B, we define a version of it raised over the sequence of
nominal constants ~a and away from a signature Σ as
∀~h.(∇~z.H [h1 ~a/x1, . . . , hn ~a/xn]) ,
B[h1 ~a/x1, . . . , hn ~a/xn],
where h1, . . . , hn are distinct variables of suitable type that
do not appear in Σ. Given the sequent Σ : Γ ⊢ C and a
sequence of nominal constants ~c none of which appear in
the support of Γ or C, let σ be any substitution of the form
{h′ ~c/h | h ∈ Σ and h′ is a variable of
suitable type that is not in Σ}.
Then the sequent Σσ : Γσ ⊢ Cσ constitutes a version of
Σ : Γ ⊢ C raised over ~c.
The introduction rules based on definitions are presented
in Figure 2. The defL rule has a set of premises that is gen-
erated by considering each definitional clause of the form
∀~x.(∇~z.H) , B in the following fashion. Assuming that
~z = z1, . . . , zn, let ~c = c1, . . . , cn be a sequence of dis-
tinct nominal constants none of which appear in the support
of Γ, A or C and let Σ′ : A′,Γ′ ⊢ C′ denote a version of
the lower sequent raised over ~c. Further, let H ′ and B′ be
obtained by taking the head and body of a version of the
clause being considered raised over a listing ~a of the con-
stants in the support of A and away from Σ′ and applying
the substitution [c1/z1, . . . , cn/zn] to them. Then the set of
premises arising from this clause are obtained by consider-
ing all permutations π of ~a~c and all substitutions θ such that
(π.H ′)θ = A′θ, with the proviso that the range of θ may
not contain any nominal constants.
The defR rule has exactly one premise that is obtained
by using any one definitional clause. The formulas B′ and
H ′ are generated from this clause as in the defL case, but
π is now taken to be any one permutation of ~a~c and θ is
taken to be any one substitution such that (π.H ′)θ = A′,
again with the proviso that the range of θ may not contain
any nominal constants.
In summary, the definition rules are based on raising the
sequent over the nominal constants picked for the ∇ vari-
ables from the definition, raising the definition over nomi-
nal constants from the sequent, and then unifying the cho-
sen atomic judgment and the head of the definition under
various permutations of the nominal constants. As it is
stated, the set of premises in the defL rule arising from any
5
⊢ I z x : I x ⊢ I (s x) Σ : Γ, I N ⊢ C
Σ : Γ, nat N ⊢ C natL
Σ : Γ ⊢ nat z natR
Σ : Γ ⊢ nat N
Σ : Γ ⊢ nat (s N)
natR
Figure 3. Rules for natural number induction
one definitional clause is potentially infinite because of the
need to consider every unifying substitution. It is possible
to restrict these substitutions instead to the members of a
complete set of unifiers. In the situations where there is a
single most general unifier, as is the case when we are deal-
ing with the higher-order pattern fragment [18], the number
of premises arising from each definition clause is bounded
by the number of permutations. In practice, this number can
be quite small as illustrated in Section 4.
Two restrictions must be placed on definitional clauses
to ensure consistency of the logic. The first is that no nomi-
nal constants may appear in such a clause; this requirement
also enforces an equivariance property for definitions. The
second is that such clauses must be stratified so as to guar-
antee the existence of fixed points. To do this we associate
with each predicate p a natural number lvl(p), the level of
p. The notion is generalized to formulas as follows.
Definition 1. Given a formula B, its level lvl(B) is defined
as follows:
1. lvl(p t¯) = lvl(p)
2. lvl(⊥) = lvl(⊤) = 0
3. lvl(B ∧ C) = lvl(B ∨ C) = max(lvl(B), lvl(C))
4. lvl(B ⊃ C) = max(lvl(B) + 1, lvl(C))
5. lvl(∀x.B) = lvl(∇x.B) = lvl(∃x.B) = lvl(B)
For every definitional clause ∀~x.(∇~z.H) , B, we re-
quire lvl(B) ≤ lvl(H). This stratification condition en-
sures that a definition cannot depend negatively on itself.
More precise stratification conditions which allow such de-
pendency in a controlled fashion are possible, but we choose
this condition for simplicity. See [15, 34] for a description
of why these properties lead to consistency.
2.5. Induction over natural numbers
The final component of G is an encoding of natural num-
bers and rules for carrying out induction over these num-
bers. This form of induction is useful in reasoning about
specifications of computations because it allows us to in-
duct on the height of object-logic proof trees that encode the
lengths of computations. Specifically, we introduce the type
nt and corresponding constructors z : nt and s : nt → nt.
Use of induction is controlled by the distinguished predi-
cate nat : nt→ o. The rules for this predicate are presented
in Figure 3. The rule natL is actually a rule schema, pa-
rameterized by the induction invariant I . Providing induc-
tion over only natural numbers is mostly a matter of conve-
nience in studying the meta-theory of G. Extending induc-
tion to other algebraic datatypes [23, 33] should have little
impact on the meta-theory of G, although it would clearly
be a useful extension for any system implementing G (such
as Abella [7]).
3. Cut-elimination and consistency for G
The consistency of G is an immediate consequence of
the cut-elimination result for this logic. Cut-elimination is
proved for LGω [35] by a generalization of the approach
used for FOλ∆IN [15] that is itself based on a technique in-
troduced by Tait [32] and refined by Martin-Lo¨f [12]. The
main aspect of this generalization is recognizing and uti-
lizing the fact that certain transformations of sequents pre-
serve provability and also do not increase (minimum) proof
height. The particular transformations that are considered
in the case of LGω have to do with weakening of hypothe-
ses, permutations of nominal constants, and substitutions
for eigenvariables. We can use this framework to show that
cut can be eliminated from G by adding one more transfor-
mation to this collection. This transformation pertains to the
raising of sequents that is needed in the introduction rules
based on the extended form of definitional clauses. We mo-
tivate this transformation by sketching the structure of the
argument as it concerns the use of such clauses below.
The critical part of the cut-elimination argument is the
reduction of what are called the essential cases of the use
of the cut rule, i.e., the situations where the last rule in the
derivation is a cut and the last rules in the derivations of its
premises introduce the cut formula. Now, the only rules of
G that are different from those of LGω are defL and defR.
Thus, we have to consider a different argument only when
these rules are the last ones used in the premise derivations
in an essential case of a cut. In this case, the overall deriva-
tion has the form
Π1
Σ′ : Γ′ ⊢ (pi.B′)θ
Σ : Γ ⊢ A
defR
(
Πρ,pi
′,B′′
2
Σ′′ρ : (pi′.B′′)ρ,∆′′ρ ⊢ C′′ρ
)
Σ : A,∆ ⊢ C
defL
Σ : Γ,∆ ⊢ C
cut
where Π1 and Πρ,pi
′,B′′
2 represent derivations of the relevant
sequents. Let Σ′ : Γ′ ⊢ A′ be the raised version of Σ : Γ ⊢
A and let H ′ and B′ be the head and body of the version of
the definitional clause raised over supp(A) and away from
Σ′ used in the defR rule. From the definition of this rule,
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we know that θ is substitution such that (π.H ′)θ = A′. Let
θ′ be the restriction of θ to the free variables of H ′. Clearly
(π.H ′)θ = (π.H ′)θ′ and (π.B′)θ = (π.B′)θ′. Further,
since the free variables of H ′ are distinct from the variables
in Σ′, θ′ has no effect on Σ′, ∆′, C′, or A′. Thus, it must be
the case that (π.H ′)θ′ = A′θ′. From this it follows that
Πθ
′,pi,B′
2
Σ′ : (π.B′)θ′,∆′ ⊢ C′
is included in the set of derivations above the lower sequent
of the defL rule. We can therefore reduce the cut in question
to the following:
Π1
Σ′ : Γ′ ⊢ (π.B′)θ′
Πθ
′,pi,B′
2
Σ′ : (π.B′)θ′,∆′ ⊢ C′
Σ′ : Γ′,∆′ ⊢ C′
The proof of cut-elimination for LGω is based on induction
over the height of the right premise in a cut, therefore this
cut can be further reduced and eliminated. The essential
properties we need to complete the proof at this point are
that Σ′ : Γ′,∆′ ⊢ C′ is provable if and only if Σ : Γ,∆ ⊢ C
is provable, and that both proofs have the same height in this
case. We formalize these in the lemma below.
Definition 2 (Proof height). The height of a derivation Π,
denoted by ht(Π), is 1 if Π has no premise derivations and
is the least upper bound of {ht(Πi) + 1}i∈I if Π has the
premise derivations {Πi}i∈I where I is some index set.
Lemma 3 (Raising). Let Σ : Γ ⊢ C be a sequent, let ~c be a
list of nominal constants not in the support of Γ or C, and
let Σ′ : Γ′ ⊢ C′ be a version of Σ : Γ ⊢ C raised over
~c. Then Σ : Γ ⊢ C has a proof of height h if and only if
Σ′ : Γ′ ⊢ C′ has a proof of height h.
With this lemma in place, the following theorem and its
corollary follow.
Theorem 4. The cut rule can be eliminated from G without
affecting the provability relation.
Corollary 5. The logic G is consistent, i.e., it is not the case
that both A and A ⊃ ⊥ are provable.
Cut-elimination is also useful in designing theorem
provers and its counterpart, cut-admissibility, allows one to
reason richly about the properties of such proof procedures.
4. Examples
We will often suppress the outermost universal quanti-
fiers in displayed definitions and will assume that capital
letters denote implicitly universally quantified variables.
member B L , ∃n.nat n ∧ elementn B L
elementz B (B :: L) , ⊤
element(s N) B (C :: L) , elementN B L
Figure 4. List membership
Freshness In Section 2 we showed how the property of
freshness could be defined in G by the definitional clause
∀E.(∇x.fresh x E) , ⊤.
This clause ensures that the atomic judgment (fresh X E)
holds if and only if X is a nominal constant which does not
appear anywhere in the term E. To see the simplicity and
directness of this definition, consider how we might define
freshness in a system like LGω which allows for definitions
only of atomic judgments. In this situation, we will have to
verify that X is a nominal constant by ruling out the possi-
bility that it is a term of one of the other permitted forms.
Then, checking that X does not appear in E will require an
explicit walking over the structure of E. In short, such a
definition would have to have the specific structure of terms
coded into it and would also use (a mild form of) negative
judgments.
To illustrate how the definition in G can be used in a rea-
soning task, consider proving the following lemma
∀x, e, ℓ.(fresh x ℓ ∧member e ℓ) ⊃ fresh x e
where member is defined in Figure 4. This lemma is useful
in constructing arguments such as type uniqueness where
one must know that a list does not contain a typing judgment
for a particular variable. The proof of this lemma proceeds
by induction on the natural number n quantified in the body
of member. The base case and the inductive step eventually
require showing the following:
∀x, b, ℓ. fresh x (b :: ℓ) ⊃ fresh x b
∀x, b, ℓ. fresh x (b :: ℓ) ⊃ fresh x ℓ
We shall consider the proof of only the first statement; the
proof of the second has a similar structure.
The first statement follows if we can prove the sequent
x, b, ℓ : fresh x (b :: ℓ) ⊢ fresh x b.
Consider how defL acts on the hypothesis (fresh x (b :: ℓ))
in this sequent. First the clause for fresh is raised over the
support of the hypothesis, but this is empty so raising has no
effect. Second, the sequent is raised over some new nominal
constant c corresponding to the ∇ in the head of the defini-
tion for fresh. The last step is to consider all permutations
π of the set {c} and all solutions θ of
(π.fresh c e)θ = (fresh (x′ c) ((b′ c) :: (ℓ′ c)))θ.
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seqN L 〈A〉 , member A L
seq(s N) L (B ∧ C) , seqN L B ∧ seqN L C
seq(s N) L (A ⊃ B) , seqN (A :: L) B
seq(s N) L (∀B) , ∇x.seqN L (B x)
seq(s N) L 〈A〉 , ∃b.prog A b ∧ seqN L b
Figure 5. Second-order hereditary Harrop
logic in G
There is, in fact, a most general unifier here:
θ = [x′ → (λx.x), b′ → (λx.b′′),
ℓ′ → (λx.ℓ′′), e→ (b′′ :: ℓ′′)].
The resulting sequent is
b′′, ℓ′′ : ⊤ ⊢ fresh c b′′
The next step in this proof is to apply defR to the con-
clusion. To do this we first raise the clause for fresh over
the support of the conclusion which is {c}. Then we raise
the sequent over a new nominal constant c′ correspond-
ing to the ∇ in the head of the definition. Finally we
need to find a permutation π of {c, c′} and a solution θ to
(π.fresh c′ (e′ c))θ = fresh c (b′′′ c′). Here we find the
permutation which swaps c and c′ and the solution θ which
unifies e′ and b′′′. The resulting sequent is then
b′′′, ℓ′′′ : ⊤ ⊢ ⊤
which is trivially provable.
Typing contexts We now illustrate an approach to ani-
mating and reasoning about the static and dynamic seman-
tics of programming languages. The first step in this ap-
proach is that of encoding these two kinds of semantics us-
ing the (second-order fragment of the) logic of hereditary
Harrop formulas. Specifications provided through these
formulas have a natural executable interpretation based on
the logic programming paradigm [21]. The interesting part
from the perspective of this paper is that we can encode
provability of this subset of hereditary Harrop formulas as
a definition in G. This definition, then, becomes the bridge
for reasoning about the (executable) specifications.
To develop these ideas in more detail, we encode prov-
ability in the second-order hereditary Harrop logic as a
three-place definition (seqN L G) where L denotes the
context of hypothetical (assumed) atomic formulas and G
denotes the goal formula [16, 22]. The argument N cor-
responds to the height of the proof tree and is used for in-
ductive arguments; we write this argument as a subscript to
∀m,n, t, u[of m (arr u t) ∧ of n u ⊃ of (app m n) t]
∀r, t, u[∀x[of x t ⊃ of (r x) u] ⊃ of (abs t r) (arr t u)]
Figure 6. Simple typing of λ-terms
downplay its significance. The definition of seq is presented
in Figure 5. The constructor 〈·〉 is used to inject atomic for-
mulas into formulas; as such, it serves as a device for isolat-
ing atomic formulas. The object level universal quantifier
is reflected into a meta level generic (i.e., ∇) quantifier in
the definition of seq; this treatment turns out to capture the
computational semantics of the universal quantifier rather
precisely. Backchaining is realized by the last clause of seq.
In giving meaning to this clause, we expect that the spec-
ification of interest in a particular situation (i.e., the logic
program that we want to reason about) has been encoded
through the definition of prog. In particular, a logic pro-
gram clause of the form ∀x¯.((G x¯) ⊃ 〈A x¯〉) would result,
in the reasoning context, in the addition of a definitional
clause ∀x¯.prog (A x¯) (G x¯) , ⊤ that can be used by the
seq predicate. To simplify notation, we write L  P for
∃n.(nat n ∧ seqn L P ). When L is nil we write just P .
An example of a specification that we may wish to rea-
son about is that of the typing rules for the simply typed
λ-calculus. These rules can be encoded using hereditary
Harrop formulas as shown in Figure 6 that, in turn, would
be reflected into definitional clauses for prog as described
above. In these formulas, app and abs are the usual con-
structors for application and abstraction in the untyped λ-
calculus. Note that no explicit context of typing assump-
tions is used in these rules: rather the hypothetical judg-
ment of hereditary Harrop formulas is used to keep track of
such assumptions. This context is made explicit only when
reasoning about this specification via the seq definition.
Consider demonstrating the type uniqueness property for
the simply typed λ-calculus using the seq encoding. We can
do this by showing that the formula
∀m, t, s.(〈of m t〉∧ 〈of m s〉) ⊃ t = s,
is a theorem: here, the binary predicate = is defined by
the single clause ∀x. x = x , ⊤. We can prove this for-
mula using an induction on natural numbers but, to do this,
we must generalize it to account for the fact that the rule
for typing abs that allows us to descend under abstractions
enhances the atomic formulas assumed by seq. A suitably
generalized form of the statement, then, is
∀ℓ,m, t, s.(cntx ℓ ∧ ℓ〈of m t〉 ∧ ℓ〈of m s〉) ⊃ t = s.
Now, this formula is provable only if the definition of cntx
ensures that if cntx ℓ holds then ℓ is of the form
(of c1 T1 :: . . . :: of cn Tn :: nil),
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cntx nil , ⊤
cntx (of X A :: L) , (∀M,N.X = app M N ⊃ ⊥) ∧
(∀M,B.X = abs B M ⊃ ⊥) ∧
(∀B.member (of X B) L ⊃ ⊥) ∧
cntx L
Figure 7. cntx in LGω
cntx nil , ⊤
(∇x.cntx (of x A :: L)) , cntx L
Figure 8. cntx in G
where c1 . . . cn are distinct nominal constants. The chal-
lenge then, is in providing a definition of cntx which accu-
rately describes this requirement. In particular, the defini-
tion must ensure that the first arguments to of in the ele-
ments of this list are nominal constants and not some other
piece of syntax, and it must also ensure that each such con-
stant is distinct from all others.
InLGω, cntx can be defined by explicitly restricting each
element of the context as shown in Figure 7. This definition
checks that the first argument to of is a nominal constant
by explicitly ruling out all other possibilities for it. Then,
to ensure distinctness of arguments, the rest of the list is
traversed using member. This definition is evidently com-
plex and the complexity carries over also into the process of
reasoning based on it.
In G we can give a direct and concise definition of cntx
using ∇ quantification in the head of a definition as is done
in Figure 8. The occurrence of the ∇-bound variable x in
the first argument of of codifies the fact that type assign-
ments are only made for nominal constants. The uniqueness
of such nominal constants is enforced by the quantification
structure of cntx: the variable L cannot contain any occur-
rences of x. With this definition of cntx, the generalized
theorem of type uniqueness is provable. Use of defL on the
hypothesis of cntx ℓ will allow only the possibility of type
assignments for nominal constants, while use of defR will
verify that the contexts that are created in treating abstrac-
tions align with the requirements imposed by the definition
of cntx.
Arbitrarily cascading substitutions Reducibility argu-
ments, such as Tait’s proof of normalization for the simply
typed λ-calculus [32], are based on judgments over closed
terms. During reasoning, however, one is often working
with open terms. To compensate, the closed term judgment
is extended to open terms by considering all possible closed
substz nil T T , ⊤
(∇x.subst(s N) ((x, V ) :: L) (T x) S) ,
substN L (T V ) S
Figure 9. Arbitrary cascading substitutions
instantiations of the open terms. When reasoning with G,
open terms are denoted by terms with nominal constants
representing free variables. The general form of an open
term is thus M c1 · · · cn, and we want to consider all pos-
sible instantiations M V1 · · · Vn where the Vi are closed
terms. This type of arbitrary cascading substitutions is dif-
ficult to realize in reasoning systems based on λ-tree syntax
since M would have an arbitrary number of abstractions.
We can define arbitrary cascading substitutions in G us-
ing the unique structure of definitions. In particular, we can
define a predicate which holds on a list of pairs (ci, Vi), a
term with the form M c1 · · · cn and a term of the form
M V1 · · · Vn. The idea is to iterate over the list of pairs
and for each pair (c, V ) use ∇ in the head of a definition
to abstract c out of the first term and then substitute V be-
fore continuing. This is the motivation for subst defined in
Figure 9. Note that we have also added a natural number
argument to be used for inductive proofs.
Given the definition of subst one may then show that ar-
bitrary cascading substitutions have many of the same prop-
erties as normal higher-order substitutions. For instance, in
the domain of the untyped λ-calculus, we can show that
subst acts compositionally via the following lemmas.
∀n, ℓ, t, r, s.(nat n ∧ substn ℓ (app t r) s) ⊃
∃u, v.s = app u v ∧ substn ℓ t u ∧ substn ℓ r v
∀n, ℓ, t, r.(nat n ∧ substn ℓ (abs t) r) ⊃
∃s.r = abs s ∧ ∇z.substn ℓ (t z) (s z)
Both of these lemmas have straightforward proofs: induct
on n, use defL on the assumption of subst, apply the induc-
tive hypothesis and use defR to complete the proof.
5. Related work
Mechanized reasoning about structural operational se-
mantic-style specifications of formal systems has received
the attention of other researchers. Recent impetus for this
kind of reasoning has been provided by a desire for com-
puter verified proofs in the realm of programming lan-
guage theory [2]. One line of research focuses on de-
veloping proofs within the framework provided by an ex-
isting and well-developed interactive theorem prover such
as Coq [4] and Isabelle/HOL [25]. Many of the contexts
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in which machine authenticated reasoning of this kind is
needed deal with objects involving binding. Several pre-
vious attempts have been characterized by the use of alge-
braic datatypes, enhanced perhaps by a de Bruijn-like rep-
resentation of bound variables, in the encoding of binding
constructs. While some success has been achieved using
this approach to object representation [10, 11, 38], it has
also been noted that the real reasoning task is often over-
whelmed under such an approach by the proofs of mundane
binding and substitution oriented lemmas.
The more natural and more promising approaches to the
kind of reasoning of interest are the ones that provide spe-
cial logic based treatments of binding such as is manifest in
λ-tree syntax. We discuss the main lines of research under
this rubric below.
Nominal logic based reasoning Nominal logic extends
first-order syntax with primitives for treating variable names
in such a way that α-equivalence classes are recognized
[28]. This considerably simplifies the treatment of bind-
ing in specifications. In contrast to the approach underlying
our work, no separate meta-logic has as yet been developed
for reasoning about nominal logic descriptions. Reasoning
about specifications written in this logic is instead realized
by axiomatizing the primitives of the logic in a rich system
such as Coq or Isabelle/HOL [1, 37]. This approach has
proved successful for many applications.
Aside from the absence of a meta-logic, the most promi-
nent difference between the nominal logic based approach
and our work is that we use λ-tree syntax and thus obtain
a comprehensive treatment of both α-equivalence and sub-
stitution within the logic. The nominal logic approach does
not provide any direct support for substitution, and instead
requires substitution to be defined on a case-by-case basis.
In reasoning, this means that various substitution lemmas
need to be proved for each syntactic class over which sub-
stitution is defined. Another difference worth noting is that
we can derive freshness as a consequence of the nesting of
quantifiers in an explicit definition of the fresh predicate,
whereas nominal logic approaches either take freshness as
primitive or define it in terms of set membership.
Two-levels of logic McDowell & Miller [13, 14, 16] ex-
plored using a two-level approach to reasoning about, for
example, the operational semantics and the typing of small
programming languages. Both levels of logic shared the
same λ-tree approach to the treatment of (object-level and
meta-level) binding: the object-logic was a simple second-
order intuitionistic logic and the meta-logic was called
FOλ∆IN. While FOλ∆IN contained inference rules for def-
initions, it lacked the∇-quantifier. As a result, the seq pred-
icate could not be specified in the same direct fashion as it
is in Figure 5.
As we illustrated briefly in Section 4, replacing FOλ∆IN
with G strengthens the expressiveness of the meta-logic by
allowing more declarative approaches to the specification of
invariants for (object-level) contexts. As a result, many of
the theorems that have been proved in FOλ∆IN [16] can be
given much more understandable proofs in G.
Twelf Pfenning and Schru¨mann [31] also describe a two-
level approach in which LF terms and types are used at the
object-level and the logic M2 is used at the meta-level.
Schru¨mann’s PhD thesis [30] further extended that meta-
logic to one called M+2 . This framework is realized in
Twelf [27], which also provides a related style of meta-
reasoning based on mode, coverage, and termination check-
ing over higher-order judgments in LF. Their approach also
makes use of λ-tree syntax at both the object and meta-
levels and goes beyond our proposal here in that they handle
the complexities of dependent types and proof objects [9].
On the other hand, the kinds of meta-level theorems they
can prove are different from what is available in G. For ex-
ample, implication and negation are not present in M+2 and
cannot be encoded in higher-order LF judgments: hence,
properties such as bisimulation for CCS or the π-calculus
are not provable.
A key component in M+2 and in the higher-order LF
judgment approach to meta-reasoning is the ability to spec-
ify invariants related to the structure of meta-logical con-
texts. These invariants are called regular worlds and their
analogue in our system is judgments such as cntx which
explicitly describe the structure of contexts. While the ap-
proach to proving properties in Twelf is powerful and con-
venient for many applications, one might prefer defining ex-
plicit invariants, such as cntx, over the use of regular worlds,
since this allows describing more general judgments over
contexts, such as in the example of arbitrary cascading sub-
stitutions where the subst predicate actively manipulates the
context of a term.
Implementation The first author has implemented a sig-
nificant portion of G in a recently released system called
Abella [7]. This system provides an interactive tactics-
based interface to proof construction. The primary focus
of Abella is on reasoning about object-level specifications
written in hereditary Harrop formulas: provability in that
logic is provided by a definition similar to that of seq in
Figure 5. Through this approach, Abella is able to take
advantage of meta-level properties of the logic of heredi-
tary Harrop formulas (e.g., cut and instantiation properties)
while never having to reason outside of G.
Abella has been used in many applications, including all
the examples mentioned in this paper. First-order results in-
clude reasoning on structures such as natural numbers and
lists. Taking advantage of λ-tree syntax, application do-
mains such as the simply typed λ-calculus are directly ac-
cessible. Particular results include equivalence of big-step
and small-step evaluation, preservation of typing for both
forms of evaluation, and determinacy for both forms of eval-
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uation. More advanced results which make use of generic
judgments for describing contexts include type uniqueness,
disjoint partitioning of λ-terms into normal and non-normal
form, and the Church-Rosser theorem. Larger applications
include challenges 1a and 2a of the POPLmark challenge
[2], a task which involves reasoning about the contexts of
subtyping judgments for F<:, a λ-calculus with bounded
subtype polymorphism. Finally, we have formalized a proof
of normalization for the simply-typed λ-calculus based on
Tait’s reducibility argument [32]. This last example uses
the formalization of arbitrarily cascading substitutions de-
scribed Section 4.
6. Future work
We are presently investigating the extension of G with
a general treatment of induction over definitions as in the
closely related logic Linc [33]. This extension would sim-
plify many inductive arguments by obviating explicit mea-
sures in induction; thus, natural numbers encoding compu-
tation lengths would not be needed in the definitions of the
element and subst predicates considered in Section 4 if we
can induct directly on the unfolding of their definitions. An-
other benefit of this approach to induction is that it has a
naturally dual rule for coinduction over coinductive defini-
tions. This rule has been found useful in Linc, for example,
in proving properties of systems such as the π-calculus.
At a practical level, we are continuing to develop Abella
as a theorem proving system and to explore its use in com-
plex reasoning tasks. We expect to use Abella to provide
more elegant proofs of the many meta-logical theorems
found in [16], which include cut-elimination theorems, type
preservation, and determinacy of typing and evaluation. Fi-
nally, if the previously mentioned work on coinduction is
completed, Abella can be used to explore the role of generic
definitions in a coinductive setting.
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